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1. Introduction 
 
The current U.K. government has put improving productivity at the top of the policy agenda.  
Its most recent report drew attention to a shortfall in total factor productivity (TFP) as an 
important part of the British labour productivity gap that is revealed by international 
comparisons (HM Treasury, 2000).  This reflects the now pervasive use of neoclassical 
growth accounting to benchmark productivity performance. 
The state of the art growth accounting study of postwar British productivity 
performance is that of O'Mahony (1999).  She provides an analysis that documents 
comparative levels of labour productivity in five countries, measured in terms of purchasing 
power parity adjusted real GDP per hour worked, and then proceeds to account for growth of 
labour productivity in terms of capital deepening and TFP growth using standard Solow 
growth model assumptions.  This analysis is conducted for the whole economy and also on a 
more disaggregated basis.  A summary of her results for U.K. manufacturing and a comparison 
with West Germany are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 reports rapid TFP growth in both countries during the so-called ‘Golden Age’, 
which ended in the early 1970s and was then followed by a marked slowdown.  This should be 
interpreted in a context of catch-up, where both countries had an opportunity to emulate 
aspects of American manufacturing technology in a situation where, initially, the United States 
had a very large productivity lead (Nelson and Wright, 1992).  In more recent decades the 
productivity gap between the United States and western Europe has been smaller and the 
scope for rapid TFP growth based on catch-up much less. 
In a pure Solow model with perfect competition and constant returns to scale, TFP 
growth equals the contribution of technological progress.  More generally this is not the case.  
With endogenous innovation embodied in new types of capital, better technology partly has its 
effect through the capital contribution, in which case TFP growth then understates the impact 
of technological progress (Barro, 1999).  Even where technological change is exogenous and 
disembodied, TFP growth only measures its contribution to growth correctly when there are 
constant returns to scale, factor shares reflect marginal products, and there are no fixed factors 
of production.  In standard growth accounting comparisons these problems are either assumed 
away or, for the purpose of benchmarking, taken to impart equal bias in each case.  When 
these assumptions are violated it is possible, however, to use econometric techniques to filter 
out the effects to obtain ‘pure’ TFP growth (Morrison, 1992, 1993).  In this paper we use a 
version of the methodology developed by Morrison to reconsider the contribution of 
innovation to productivity growth in West Germany and the U.K. 
West Germany has been the traditional comparator when the productivity performance 
of British manufacturing is assessed, with detailed growth accounting studies dating back as 
far as Panic (1976).  The general belief is that Germany has had a much more dynamic national 
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system of innovation (Pavitt and Patel, 1988), and commentators have singled out West 
German manufacturing firms as exceptionally capable by international standards in terms of 
high quality incremental (although not radical) innovation (Carlin and Soskice, 1997).  
Although recent discussions have recognized a relatively strong labour productivity 
performance in British manufacturing in the 1980s (Oulton, 1995), the period of relatively 
rapid growth of output per worker in the U.K. in the 1980s is generally regarded as owing a 
good deal to a shakeout of inefficient firms and working practices rather than to strong 
technological advance (Bean and Crafts, 1996). 
One particularly interesting aspect of explanations for differences in Anglo-German 
productivity performance is the role that may be played by systems of corporate governance in 
the two countries.  Recent research into Britain's productivity performance has highlighted the 
role of principal agent problems in firms in which the absence of a dominant external 
shareholder implies weak control over the effort that managers exert to control costs (Nickell, 
1996).  Theory predicts that, when competition is weak, the adoption of cost-reducing 
innovations in these so-called ‘conservative’ firms will be inhibited by managers’ dislike of the 
effort involved (Aghion et al., 1997).  Empirical research confirms that, in the U.K., greater 
product market competition has been associated with faster productivity growth where firms 
lack a dominant external shareholder but not otherwise (Nickell et al., 1997).  By contrast, 
German manufacturing has been much less exposed to agency problems within firms because 
the predominant pattern is one of concentrated share ownership (Edwards and Fischer, 1994).  
This analysis has led the present U.K. government to the view that strengthening competition 
policy is an essential component of its policy to eliminate the productivity gap.  In this context, 
a useful by-product of the Morrison methodology is that it generates estimates of changes in 
market power over time. 
In what follows we address the following questions: 
 
(1) Are traditional measures of TFP growth seriously biased? 
 
(2) Does adjusting for bias materially affect comparisons either between British and German 
TFP performance or of British TFP performance over time? 
 
(3) What light do the results throw on the relationship between competition and comparative 
TFP growth? 
 
Section 2 reviews the corrections for bias in TFP measurement that are needed to 
allow for economies of scale, the impact of fixed factors of production, and costs of 
adjustment to optimal capacity.  Section 3 sets out the econometric approach that we have 
used to implement these adjustments and reports the results of these estimations, while 
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discussion of the data is left to the appendix.  Section 4 considers the implications of these 
results in the context of the literature on manufacturing productivity growth in the U.K. and 
West Germany.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Correcting for Biases in TFP Measurement 
 
(a) The Traditional Framework for Productivity Growth Measurement 
 
Following Morrison (1992), we begin by assuming that firms face a production function 
? ?tYY ,??  or, equivalently, a dual cost function ? ?YtpCC ,,? .  Here Y is output, C is total 
costs, ? ?J??? ,,1?  is a vector of J inputs with corresponding price vector ? ?Jppp ,,1? , 
and t denotes technology.  Primal and dual multifactor productivity growth (MFPG) measures 
can be defined as the elasticities of these functions with respect to t, i.e., YttY ???? ln  and 
CttC ???? ln .  These measures reflect the residuals of total output (cost) growth less the 
contributions of the variables other than t.  With instantaneous adjustment, constant returns to 
scale (CRTS) and perfect competition, these residuals isolate technical change. 
 By taking the differential of the production function, recognising that with profit 
maximisation and perfect competition, ? ? jjY pYp ??? ? , where Yp  is the price of output, and 
solving for Yt? , yields 
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where YppS Yjjj ??  is the share of the jth input in the value of total output.  Similarly, the 
cost-side productivity growth residual may be expressed as 
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where ?? j jjpC ?  and CvpM jjj ? .  With CRTS, instantaneous adjustment and perfect 
competition, CtYt ?? ?? .  The equivalence of the two measures arises because CRTS implies 
that no returns are generated from scale economies, instantaneous adjustment guarantees no 
returns exist from varying the utilisation of inputs, and perfect competition ensures no returns 
to market power.  If any of these assumptions are relaxed, however, the revenue generated 
must be taken into account. 
Figure 1, taken from Morrison (1993), illustrates the general point.  Consider a firm at 
point A, at a point of tangency between short run average cost curve 0SRAC , defined for a 
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fixed capital stock, and long run average cost curve 0LRAC , with output 0Y .  The cost curves 
then fall to 1SRAC  and 1LRAC , such that in full long run equilibrium the firm is now able to 
be at point D with output 1Y .  However, in the short run, if neither output nor capital stock 
change, the measured decrease in average cost is only from ac  to bc , rather than to dc .  If full 
adjustment and CRTS were assumed, then this would appear to be the full potential decline at 
point B.  In fact, achieving the full decline involves adjustment of the fixed input (B to C) and 
taking advantage of economies of scale (C to D).  This last component is not, of course, TFP 
growth due to innovation and a shift of the cost curve, but it would be wrongly measured as 
such if long run adjustment is captured but CRTS imposed.  So the aim in eliminating biases in 
measurement is to capture the change in long run average cost, which at 0Y  is the distance ac  
to cc . In this case, unrecognised economies of scale (fixity of inputs) would lead to an (under) 
overestimate. 
 
(b) Taking Account of Scale Economies 
 
Returns to the firm due to scale economies cause a deviation between marginal cost (MC) and 
average cost ( YCAC ? ) and thus a difference between Yp  (which under perfect competition 
equals MC) and AC.  We should therefore correct Ct?  for the erroneous assumption of CRTS: 
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where YCCY lnln ????  is the inverse of returns to scale and ? ?? ?YYCY??1  is the bias 
correction if CRTS is inappropriately assumed. 
 
(c) Subequilibrium Impacts 
 
We now introduce a vector of fixed factors, ? ?Kx,,xx 1?  and define the variable cost 
function ? ?t,x,p,yG .  The shadow value of the fixed input kx  is kk xGZ ???? .  Total costs 
can then be written as ??? k kk xpGC , where kp  is the market price of kx , and shadow 
costs can be defined as ??? k kk xZGC * .  Capacity utilisation is then defined as 
CCCU *? .  When there is excess capacity (over-utilisation) the shadow values of the fixed 
inputs will fall short of (exceed) their market prices so that 1?CU  ( 1?CU ).  Morrison 
shows that  
 
 CYk CkCU ?? ??? ?1         (4) 
 
where 
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 ? ? CxZp kkkCk ???  
and that with sub-equilibrium, cost-side MFPG becomes 
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F stands for ‘fixity adaptation’ and the last expression is the bias correction.  Note that, since 
0?Ck?  affects the weights on both output and quasi-fixed input growth rates, the bias 
depends on both these rates. 
 An additional adaptation for fixity is to recognise the portion of cost change due to 
dynamic adjustment costs 
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where A represents ‘adjustment cost adaptation’.  Dynamic adjustment costs are familiar from 
theoretical and empirical analyses of investment (Nickell, 1978; Bond and Meghir, 1994).  
They arise from increases in the cost of installing new capital goods as attempts to move to 
optimal capacity are speeded up.  In principle, these could result from factors internal (e.g., 
Penrose effects) or external to the firm, such as running into increasingly steep supply curves 
for equipment and structures.  Our model only corrects for the latter type which are reflected 
in the term in the second derivative of the market price of fixed inputs in (6). 
 Note that, so far, scale economies and utilisation are both represented by CY? .  If both 
effects exist then they can individually be measured as components of this elasticity, since the 
long-run cost elasticity 
L
CY?  can be written as  
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Hence we may define  
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where T represents ‘total adaptation’. 
 
(d) Allowing for Markups of Price Over Marginal Cost 
 
Primal MFPG measures may also be misleading if market power exists so that MCpY ? .  
The market power adjustment affects the demand side rather than being a cost adjustment.  
The markup can be defined as 
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where PY?  is the inverse demand elasticity facing the firm.  
 
3. Empirical Implementation 
 
We use U.K. and German annual data from 1950 to 1996 on the manufacturing sector to 
compute the various measures of MFPG.  There are 2?J  variable inputs, labour and energy, 
and 1?K  quasi-fixed input, the net capital stock.  The traditional measures of MFPG, Yt?  
and Ct? , can be computed using equations (1) and (2) as they are parameter free indices.  The 
adjusted cost-side indices, 
R
Ct? , 
F
Ct? , 
A
Ct?  and 
T
Ct? , require estimates of the two elasticities, 
L
CY?  
and Ck? , and the shadow price of capital, Z.  These cannot be observed directly but may be 
obtained by estimating an appropriate econometric model. 
 The model that we employ is that of Morrison (1988, 1992), and used in a similar 
context by Rossi and Toniolo (1992).  As stated above, we have two variable inputs, labour 
and energy, denoted x xl m, , with prices w wl m, , a single fixed factor (capital, k, with rental 
price r), and two exogenous arguments: b, investment in k, and x, the stock of public works.  
The Generalized Leontief restricted (or variable) cost function is then 
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The system of variable input demand equations are then given by 
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and 
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Constant returns to scale requires that all long-run output elasticities equal unity, which will be 
the case if 
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The shadow value of the fixed factor k is 
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Since total costs are defined as C G rk? ? , shadow costs can then be defined similarly as 
C G Z kk
* ? ? .  Capacity utilisation is defined as CU Ck? ?1 ? , where 
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The long-run elasticity 
L
CY?  is defined as 
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i.e., it is evaluated at the steady state values of the fixed input, Zk .  Here, the marginal cost 
MC is given by 
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The pair of demand equations given by (11) was estimated using an iterative SURE 
technique with autoregressive error corrections (attempts to estimate using three-stage least 
squares produced inferior results).  After the model was simplified by deleting insignificant 
coefficients, the parameter estimates were then used to compute the two elasticities, 
L
CY?  and 
Ck? , and the shadow price of capital, Z.  From these, capacity utilisation and long and short 
run returns to scale were calculated, which were than used as inputs to calculate the adjusted 
cost-side indices, 
R
Ct? , 
F
Ct? , 
A
Ct?  and 
T
Ct? .  Tables 2 and 3 present estimates of the two 
equations for the U.K. and Germany, respectively.  All equations produce good fits to the 
data, with 2R  statistics in excess of 0.99, many coefficients estimates highly significant, and no 
evidence of residual autocorrelation once first order autocorrelation is modelled.  Note that 
the assumption of constant returns to scale is conclusively rejected in both countries: the 
hypothesis (12) is rejected at less than the 0.001 level for the U.K. and at the 0.028 level for 
Germany. 
 To compute the markup factor M, we require an estimate of the inverse demand 
elasticity PY? .  This was obtained from an appropriate regression of Yp  on Y and using the 
estimated slope coefficient in the usual way.  The resulting sets of statistics are shown in 
Tables 4 and 5 for the U.K. and Tables 6 and 7 for Germany.   
Leaving aside the statistical properties of the model, how plausible are its results?  A 
comparison of the uncorrected primal estimates for TFP offers a check.  Oulton and 
O'Mahony (1994) presented estimates for U.K. manufacturing on a gross output basis for 
1954-86 which showed TFP growth of 1.18 per cent per year for 1954-73, for which our 
average estimate is 1.05 per cent, and ? 0.54 per cent for 1974-86, a period for which our 
average estimate is 0.54.  Given that the data sets used are not identical, we are encouraged by 
the similarity of these figures. 
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4. Discussion 
 
Unlike the conventional growth accounting results in Table 1, the estimates in Tables 5 and 7 
show higher TFP growth in both countries after 1973.  The results are not strictly comparable 
because we have worked with gross output and the dual measure of TFP, whereas O'Mahony 
(1999) was based on value added, but our primal measure also shows faster TFP growth after 
1973 in both cases.  The differences come primarily from our use of estimated cost functions 
rather than an imposed Cobb? Douglas production function. 
In both countries, however, our results suggest that crude TFP estimates, which are 
not corrected for biases resulting from scale economies, fixed factors and adjustment costs, are 
a very poor guide to the ‘true TFP’, which is obtained when those biases have been eliminated 
and which may be thought of as a better measure of the contribution of innovation to 
productivity growth.  Our ‘true TFP’ estimates (
T
Ct?? ) are, for the pre-1973 and post-1973 
periods, 4.25 and 2.69 per cent per year, respectively, in Germany, and 3.74 and 2.68 per cent 
per year, respectively, in the U.K.  An appreciable decline in the contribution of innovation 
between the two periods is precisely what economic historians would expect, since the scope 
for further catch-up had been much reduced by the 1970s when the United States was in its 
notorious TFP growth slowdown during the hiatus between the end of the Fordist era and the 
full onset of the New Economy. 
Our results are consistent with those of other quantitative studies, based on rather 
different methodologies, that have queried the apparent strength of TFP growth in U.K. 
manufacturing in the 1980s and concluded that it may not represent an acceleration of 
technological progress compared with earlier decades (Darby and Wren-Lewis, 1991; Lynde 
and Richmond, 2000).  Our conclusion is, however, much stronger in that we find a large 
decrease in the rate of innovation.  In fact our results are more similar to those of Cameron 
(1999) who, after adjusting for various biases, found that trend TFP growth fell from 3.04 per 
cent per year in 1960-73 to an average of 2.47 per cent per year between 1973 and 1995. 
With regard to comparisons between the U.K. and West Germany, ‘true TFP’ shows 
somewhat faster growth in Germany in the early postwar period but that performance was 
fairly similar after 1973.  Broadly speaking, this is a similar picture to the conventional growth 
accounting estimates in O'Mahony (1999).  It also matches the results obtained from a growth 
accounting exercise in terms of levels which explicitly considered the contribution in 1979 and 
1999 of skills and research and development to labour productivity in Britain and Germany 
and found that the gap between the two countries was virtually unchanged (Crafts and 
O'Mahony, 2001). 
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Our estimates suggest that the total bias was large in the early postwar period in both 
countries, that it then changes sign in the U.K. and becomes much smaller in Germany, and 
that crude TFP growth comparisons are seriously misleading.  In both countries there are 
diseconomies of scale, correcting for which raises the true TFP growth estimate.  But the 
really big corrections come from dynamic adjustment costs in the Golden Age and from the 
switch of sign from positive to negative in the U.K.’s adjustment costs term after 1973. 
In our model, the impact of dynamic adjustment costs arises from factors external to 
the firm.  In particular, it is the rising price of capital goods that tends to choke off the full 
realization of potential TFP gains from technological progress.  It is then not surprising to find 
a big effect in the early postwar period and that this should have decreased markedly more 
recently.  In small open economies with competitive markets the supply of capital goods can 
be expected to be elastic.  By contrast, the world of the 1950s and 1960s predates the late 
twentieth century globalization era and was a time when complaints about the physical supply 
limitations on investment were a commonplace in western Europe (United Nations, 1964). 
Average values of Tobin's Q are consistent with this picture.  In the recent past they 
have been low.  Eberly (1997) reported an average over 1981-94 for Germany of 0.73 and for 
the U.K. of 1.09.  By contrast, for the 1960s Oulton (1981) found an average of 1.45 for the 
U.K. and Chan-Lee (1986) reported an average of 1.39 for West Germany.  These estimates 
are not strictly comparable, but the clear impression is of a large backlog of projects that 
would have been profitable based on a comparison between the costs of capital (in the absence 
of adjustment costs) and stock market valuations in the earlier, but not in the more recent, 
period. 
Tables 4 and 6 report estimates of the price cost markup, ? ?PY??11 .  They show 
striking changes over time in the U.K. case, where the estimates fall from an average of well 
over 2 in the 1950s and 1960s to around 1.1 after 1980, while the estimates for West Germany 
remain in the range 1 to 1.1 throughout.  The finding of a high markup for early postwar 
Britain is not very surprising, given the prevalence of cartels and the weakness of import 
penetration (Broadberry and Crafts, 2001).  In view of the results obtained by Nickell et al. 
(1997) on the handicap that corporate governance problems imposed on British firms in the 
absence of competition, it is quite reasonable to suppose that the post Golden Age weakening 
of market power in the U.K. would have speeded up productivity growth, ceteris paribus.  
This could have been either because cost curves fell faster as a backlog of available 
innovations were adopted and/or because firms now reduced organizational slack and adjusted 
to the bottom of the long run average cost curve.  No such impact would be expected in West 
Germany because of the relative absence both of agency problems in firms and of early 
postwar market power.  This may at least partly explain the greater fall in true TFP growth in 
Germany after 1973. 
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There are good reasons to think that market power did hold back innovation in the 
U.K., since a series of studies using the Science Policy Research Unit innovations database 
have all found that the adverse effect of competition on expected returns to innovation was 
more than offset by its positive effect on managerial innovative effort (Blundell et al., 1999, 
Broadberry and Crafts, 2001, Geroski, 1990).  Nevertheless, our estimates suggest that the 
advent of greater competition in the recent past has only been sufficient to allow the U.K. to 
match Germany's performance in ‘true TFP’ growth.  This is presumably because Germany has 
had other advantages in terms of human capital, R & D, etc., which relate to other aspects of 
incentive structures that have tended to promote long term investments (Carlin and Soskice, 
1997).  Seen in this light, traditional judgements on the relative merits of national innovation 
systems in the two countries may still have some validity. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Our answers to the questions raised in the introduction are as follows. 
 
(1) Overall, these estimates suggest that it is important to worry about biases in traditional 
estimates of TFP ?  more so than seems generally to be appreciated.  Working with the 
dual measure of TFP growth in manufacturing, using prices rather than quantities, we 
found that both in the U.K. and in West Germany there was a total bias of over 2 per 
cent per year in the early postwar period.  It is important also to recognize that such 
biases are not constant across time and place but depend on circumstances. 
 
(2) The size of the bias is fairly similar in each period in both countries but changes over 
time.  Thus, there is no reason to reject the benchmark rankings of British and German 
TFP performance that have been made on the basis of conventional growth accounting.  
On the other hand, comparisons over time in each country need to be handled with 
great care and conventional procedures do run the risk of substantial error.  Our results 
suggest that the early postwar 'Golden Age' might have been better still had the 
European catch up taken place in an era of greater globalization in which the supply of 
capital goods was more elastic. 
 
(3) Our results include estimates of price cost markups.  We find that in the U.K. there 
was substantial market power in manufacturing in the early postwar period but not in 
recent decades.  In a context of British failures of corporate governance, it seems 
plausible that increasing competition has been an important factor in narrowing the gap 
in TFP growth between British and German manufacturing since the 1970s.  The 
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recent (belated) recognition by policymakers that competition policy can be an 
important part of the agenda to reduce the British productivity gap is welcome. 
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Data Appendix 
 
The sources of data were as follows. 
 
United Kingdom 
 
Y: Real gross output (£1990 bn) derived from nominal series supplied by Mary O'Mahony 
deflated using wholesale prices from the Historical Record of the Census of Production 
(1950-70) and the Annual Abstract of Statistics thereafter. 
 
Yp : Price of output as above. 
 
lx : Total hours worked from O'Mahony (1999, Tables B and C). 
 
lw : Money wage rate derived from the share of wages in value added (O'Mahony, 1999, Table 
F) multiplied by nominal value added from Mitchell (1988, pp. 824-5) to 1980 and 
thereafter UK National Accounts (1997), divided by total hours worked, as above. 
 
mx : Energy inputs (bn tonnes oil equivalent) from Digest of Energy Statistics; series extended 
back from 1960 using energy inputs/total GDP to infer movements in energy inputs. 
 
mw : Price of energy based on fuel price index for industry from Digest of Energy Statistics 
extended back beyond 1970 using retail price of fuel and light from Mitchell (1988, p. 
740). 
 
k: Real net capital stock from O'Mahony (1999 Table E) converted into £1990 bn using UK 
National Accounts (1997). 
 
x: Real net social overhead capital stock in £1990 bn from UK National Accounts various 
issues. 
 
b: Gross fixed investment from UK National Accounts and before 1965 from Feinstein (1972, 
Table 42). 
 
bw : Price of capital goods from UK National Accounts and before 1965 from Feinstein (1972, 
Table 61). 
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? : Depreciation rate from O'Mahony (1999, p. 40) assumed constant and based on 55 percent 
weight for equipment and 45% for structures. 
 
i: Nominal interest rate using consols from Mitchell (1988, p. 678) and after 1980 long-dated 
British government securities from Economic Trends. 
 ? ??? ?? ebwr , where e?  is the forecasted capital goods inflation from a first order 
autoregression of ? ? ? ?1)1( ???? wbwbwb? . 
 
West Germany 
 
Y: Real gross output (DM 1995 bn) derived from nominal series in Volkswirtschaftliche 
Gesamttrechnung FS 18 deflated using producer prices from Volkswirtschaftliche 
Gesamtrechnung FS 17. 
 
Yp : Price of output as above. 
 
lx : Total hours worked from O'Mahony (1999, Tables B and C). 
 
lw : Money wage rate derived from the share of labour in value added in O'Mahony (1999, 
Table F) multiplied by nominal value added from Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung 
FS 18 and divided by total hours worked, as above. 
 
mx : Total energy inputs (bn tonnes of oil equivalent) based on Volkswirtschaftliches 
Gesamtrechnung FS 4 from 1980 linked to industrial consumption of energy from 
OECD, Energy Balances of OECD Countries for 1960 to 1979; pre-1960 energy use is 
assumed to have been a constant ratio to output. 
 
mw : Price of energy after 1980 based on price of electricity to industry from International 
Energy Agency, Energy Prices and Taxes and before 1980 on index of coal, gas, 
electricity and petroleum constructed from Volkswirtschaftliches Gesamtrechnung FS 17.  
 
k: Real net capital stock from O'Mahony (1999, Table E) converted into DM 1995 bn using 
Volkswirtschaftliches Gesamtrechnung FS 18. 
 
x: Real net social overhead capital stock from DIW, Verkehr in Zahlen (2000). 
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b: Gross fixed investment from Volkswirtschaftliches Gesamtrechnung FS18 assunimg share 
of manufacturing in total private investment before 1960 constant at 1960/5 average. 
 
bw : Price of capital goods from Volkswirtschaftliches Gesamtrechnung FS 17 with 
adjustment to pre-1955 series to match subsequent revisions made for later years. 
 
? : Depreciation rate from O'Mahony (1999, p. 40) assumed constant and based on 64 per 
cent weight for equipment and 36 per cent for structures. 
 
i: Nominal interest rate from government bond yield reported in IMF, Financial Statistics. 
 ? ??? ?? ebwr , where e?  is the forecasted capital goods inflation from a second order 
autoregression of ? ? ? ?1)1( ???? wbwbwb? . 
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Table 1. 
Sources of Manufacturing Labour Productivity Growth (% per year) 
 
 
 1950-73 1973-95 
   
Growth of Output/Hour Worked   
West Germany 6.62 2.86 
UK 4.69 3.29 
   
Growth of Capital/Hour Worked   
West Germany 6.55 3.49 
UK 4.39 3.35 
   
TFP Growth   
West Germany 4.12 1.89 
UK 3.28 1.85 
 
 
Source: O'Mahony (1999) 
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Table 2 
U.K. Estimates of System (11) 
 
Equation Yxl  Yxm  
ii?  2.046  (9.02) 2.629  (8.69) 
ij?  - -0.462  (3.86) 
iy?  - - 
it?  - -0.089  (3.13) 
ib?  - - 
ix?  -8.951  (7.32) -7.383  (5.12) 
ik?  - - 
yy?  -1.200  (4.86) 
tt?  - 
bb?  - 
xx?  - 
yt?  - 
yb?  - 
yx?   5.636  (4.88) 
tb?  - 
tx?   0.137  (3.53) 
bx?  - 
yk?  - 
tk?  -0.099  (6.30) 
bk?  - 
xk?   2.109  (7.85) 
kk?  - 
?  - 0.804  (13.22) 
2R  0.996 0.992 
?ˆ 0.0055 0.0172 
 
Absolute t-ratios are in parentheses.  ?  is the first-order 
autoregressive error coefficient.  ?ˆ is the regression standard 
error. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 21
Table 3 
German Estimates of System (11) 
 
Equation Yxl  Yxm  
ii?  -4.603  (3.46) - 
ij?  - -0.331  (3.27) 
iy?  18.71  (2.67) 18.62  (2.65) 
it?  - -0.181  (2.58) 
ib?  -13.68  (2.19) -15.20  (2.42) 
ix?  -16.64  (1.49) -19.25  (1.72) 
ik?  -4.060  (2.68) 3.806  (2.62) 
yy?  -4.726  (2.86) 
tt?   0.062  (2.02) 
bb?  - 
xx?  - 
yt?  - 
yb?  - 
yx?   17.07  (2.64) 
tb?  - 
tx?  -2.673  (2.94) 
bx?  - 
yk?  -14.44  (2.83) 
tk?   0.736  (4.17) 
bk?   9.680  (2.21) 
xk?   11.14  (1.53) 
kk?  -1.639  (1.76) 
?  0.922  (49.87) 0.324  (2.36) 
2R  0.999 0.995 
?ˆ 0.0098 0.0306 
 
Absolute t-ratios are in parentheses.  ?  is the first-order 
autoregressive error coefficient.  ?ˆ is the regression standard 
error. 
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          Table 4 
U.K. 
Primal TFP Growth and its Components 
 
 
 
Ct??  
L
CY??  CU CY?  ? ?PY??11  ADJ Yt?  ? ?PYYt ?? ?1  
1953  3.376  1.189  0.980  1.166  1.992  2.322  1.454  2.896 
1954  3.946  1.181  0.986  1.164  2.182  2.539  1.554  3.391 
1955  1.803  1.172  0.985  1.155  2.273  2.625  0.687  1.561 
1956 -1.085  1.162  0.987  1.147  2.218  2.545 -0.427 -0.946 
1957 -0.147  1.154  0.989  1.142  2.198  2.509 -0.059 -0.129 
1958 -0.285  1.148  0.990  1.137  2.257  2.566 -0.111 -0.251 
1959  2.401  1.144  0.991  1.134  2.371  2.688  0.893  2.117 
1960  1.608  1.143  0.992  1.134  2.622  2.972  0.541  1.418 
1961 -1.757  1.137  0.992  1.128  2.490  2.809 -0.626 -1.558 
1962 -2.064  1.132  0.992  1.123  2.404  2.699 -0.765 -1.838 
1963  0.573  1.129  0.993  1.121  2.490  2.791  0.205  0.511 
1964  4.921  1.131  0.994  1.123  2.750  3.090  1.593  4.380 
1965 -1.054  1.128  0.994  1.121  2.683  3.008 -0.350 -0.940 
1966  0.100  1.125  0.994  1.118  2.614  2.924  0.034  0.089 
1967 -0.261  1.122  0.995  1.116  2.598  2.898 -0.090 -0.234 
1968  3.329  1.122  0.995  1.116  2.710  3.025  1.101  2.983 
1969  3.625  1.123  0.995  1.117  2.825  3.156  1.149  3.245 
1970  0.455  1.122  0.995  1.117  2.677  2.989  0.152  0.407 
1971 -3.242  1.117  0.995  1.112  2.265  2.518 -1.287 -2.916 
1972  0.320  1.115  0.996  1.110  2.152  2.390  0.134  0.288 
1973  5.539  1.118  0.996  1.113  2.201  2.450  2.261  4.975 
1974  5.002  1.117  0.996  1.112  1.833  2.039  2.453  4.496 
1975 -6.691  1.110  0.996  1.105  1.523  1.683 -3.976 -6.054 
1976  1.909  1.110  0.996  1.106  1.435  1.587  1.203  1.726 
1977 -2.118  1.107  0.997  1.103  1.330  1.467 -1.443 -1.919 
1978  0.482  1.105  0.997  1.101  1.295  1.427  0.338  0.438 
1979  0.418  1.104  0.997  1.101  1.267  1.395  0.299  0.379 
1980 -0.855  1.099  0.996  1.095  1.207  1.321 -0.648 -0.782 
1981 -4.992  1.093  0.996  1.089  1.169  1.273 -3.922 -4.584 
1982  2.585  1.091  0.997  1.088  1.152  1.252  2.064  2.377 
1983  5.937  1.091  0.997  1.087  1.146  1.246  4.763  5.461 
1984  6.648  1.091  0.997  1.088  1.143  1.244  5.345  6.111 
1985  1.902  1.091  0.997  1.088  1.138  1.238  1.536  1.748 
1986 -3.144  1.088  0.997  1.085  1.127  1.222 -2.573 -2.899 
1987  8.138  1.090  0.998  1.087  1.132  1.231  6.613  7.485 
1988  5.075  1.092  0.998  1.089  1.135  1.236  4.106  4.659 
1989  3.408  1.092  0.998  1.090  1.133  1.234  2.761  3.127 
1990 -3.641  1.090  0.998  1.087  1.121  1.219 -2.988 -3.350 
1991 -9.003  1.085  0.998  1.082  1.104  1.195 -7.536 -8.319 
1992  3.162  1.084  0.998  1.081  1.101  1.190  2.657  2.924 
1993  2.134  1.083  0.998  1.081  1.098  1.187  1.798  1.974 
1994  8.032  1.085  0.998  1.083  1.101  1.192  6.735  7.419 
1995  5.080  1.086  0.998  1.084  1.102  1.194  4.255  4.688 
1996  1.483  1.086  0.998  1.084  1.101  1.193  1.243  1.369 
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Table 5 
     U.K. Cost Dual TFP Growth: Traditional and Corrected 
 
 
Ct??  
R
Ct??  Bias 
F
Ct??  
Bias A
Ct??  
Bias T
Ct??  
Bias 
1954  3.450  5.145  1.695  3.359 -0.091  5.249  1.799  5.089  1.639 
1955  5.885  6.955  1.070  5.848 -0.037  4.092 -1.793  3.984 -1.901 
1956 -0.241  0.044  0.284 -0.205  0.036  1.947  2.188  1.921  2.161 
1957  1.891  2.190  0.299  1.932  0.041  4.253  2.362  4.228  2.337 
1958  0.670  1.123  0.453  0.696  0.025  3.382  2.712  3.347  2.677 
1959  3.265  3.930  0.665  3.262 -0.003  5.681  2.416  5.633  2.368 
1960  0.677  1.768  1.091  0.643 -0.034  3.197  2.520  3.123  2.446 
1961 -0.203 -0.192  0.012 -0.159  0.045  1.946  2.150  1.945  2.149 
1962 -0.451 -0.447  0.004 -0.395  0.056  2.676  3.127  2.676  3.127 
1963  1.257  1.675  0.418  1.268  0.012  3.761  2.505  3.734  2.478 
1964  4.607  5.725  1.118  4.568 -0.039  6.776  2.169  6.713  2.106 
1965 -0.973 -0.664  0.309 -0.965  0.008  0.961  1.933  0.944  1.916 
1966  1.325  1.502  0.177  1.347  0.022  3.802  2.477  3.792  2.468 
1967  0.816  0.857  0.042  0.839  0.023  2.879  2.063  2.877  2.061 
1968  3.594  4.344  0.750  3.580 -0.014  5.953  2.360  5.917  2.324 
1969  4.116  4.913  0.797  4.103 -0.012  6.789  2.673  6.751  2.636 
1970  1.187  1.607  0.420  1.192  0.005  3.708  2.521  3.690  2.503 
1971 -1.450 -1.799 -0.349 -1.413  0.036  0.324  1.773  0.340  1.790 
1972  1.328  1.491  0.164  1.334  0.006  2.519  1.191  2.512  1.184 
1973  4.536  5.572  1.036  4.504 -0.032  5.684  1.148  5.645  1.109 
1974  9.251  9.590  0.339  9.246 -0.004  9.747  0.497  9.734  0.484 
1975 -2.859 -3.761 -0.902 -2.812  0.047 -1.745  1.114 -1.707  1.152 
1976  2.513  2.901  0.389  2.503 -0.009  2.315 -0.198  2.300 -0.212 
1977  3.871  3.655 -0.215  3.878  0.008 -1.706 -5.577 -1.699 -5.570 
1978  6.749  6.768  0.019  6.751  0.003  1.900 -4.849  1.899 -4.850 
1979  0.684  0.954  0.269  0.681 -0.003  1.322  0.638  1.313  0.628 
1980  6.864  6.104 -0.760  6.900  0.036  5.876 -0.988  5.907 -0.957 
1981 -3.623 -4.379 -0.756 -3.593  0.029 -4.635 -1.012 -4.602 -0.979 
1982  3.943  3.798 -0.145  3.939 -0.004  0.604 -3.339  0.610 -3.333 
1983  7.405  7.606  0.201  7.390 -0.015  4.718 -2.686  4.711 -2.694 
1984  7.160  7.540  0.380  7.141 -0.019  5.690 -1.470  5.676 -1.484 
1985  1.699  1.913  0.214  1.691 -0.007  1.715  0.016  1.708  0.009 
1986 -2.570 -2.901 -0.331 -2.557  0.013 -2.318  0.252 -2.307  0.264 
1987  8.952  9.622  0.670  8.935 -0.017  9.980  1.029  9.960  1.009 
1988  5.150  5.735  0.585  5.138 -0.012  6.644  1.494  6.628  1.478 
1989  5.226  5.562  0.336  5.223 -0.003  7.491  2.266  7.482  2.256 
1990 -1.885 -2.108 -0.223 -1.870  0.014  0.560  2.445  0.567  2.452 
1991 -7.512 -8.239 -0.727 -7.486  0.025 -6.951  0.561 -6.929  0.583 
1992  4.833  4.858  0.025  4.832 -0.001  4.277 -0.556  4.276 -0.557 
1993  2.310  2.410  0.100  2.306 -0.004  1.719 -0.592  1.716 -0.595 
1994  8.906  9.404  0.497  8.891 -0.016  8.215 -0.691  8.201 -0.705 
1995  6.027  6.391  0.364  6.017 -0.010  4.881 -1.146  4.872 -1.155 
1996  1.361  1.552  0.191  1.356 -0.004  1.419  0.058  1.414  0.053 
 
Means 
 
 
Ct??  
R
Ct??  Bias 
F
Ct??  
Bias A
Ct??  
Bias T
Ct??  
Bias 
54-96 2.552 2.807 0.255 2.554 0.002 3.193 0.641 3.177 0.624 
54-73 1.764 2.287 0.523 1.767 0.003 3.779 2.105 3.743 1.979 
74-96 3.237 3.260 0.023 3.239 0.002 2.683 -0.554 2.684 -0.553 
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  Table 6 
Germany 
Primal TFP Growth and its Components 
 
 
 
Ct??  
L
CY??  CU CY?  ? ?PY??11  ADJ Yt?  ? ?PYYt ?? ?1  
1953 -0.370  1.381  1.008  1.392  1.027  1.429 -0.259 -0.266 
1954 -0.290  1.328  1.008  1.339  1.031  1.381 -0.210 -0.217 
1955 -0.003  1.296  1.006  1.304  1.035  1.350 -0.002 -0.002 
1956  1.613  1.273  1.002  1.277  1.038  1.325  1.217  1.263 
1957  1.331  1.255  1.002  1.257  1.039  1.306  1.019  1.059 
1958  1.916  1.239  1.004  1.244  1.042  1.296  1.479  1.540 
1959  0.460  1.227  1.004  1.233  1.046  1.290  0.357  0.373 
1960  1.015  1.221  1.004  1.225  1.051  1.288  0.788  0.829 
1961  3.554  1.214  1.004  1.219  1.051  1.281  2.774  2.916 
1962  4.992  1.208  1.002  1.211  1.056  1.279  3.904  4.123 
1963  1.581  1.201  1.003  1.204  1.058  1.274  1.241  1.313 
1964  1.988  1.198  1.003  1.201  1.062  1.276  1.558  1.655 
1965  5.959  1.195  1.002  1.198  1.067  1.278  4.661  4.975 
1966 -4.478  1.190  1.003  1.193  1.065  1.271 -3.523 -3.753 
1967 -2.306  1.183  1.003  1.187  1.066  1.265 -1.824 -1.944 
1968  9.702  1.183  1.001  1.184  1.078  1.277  7.600  8.192 
1969  5.205  1.184  1.000  1.184  1.087  1.286  4.046  4.398 
1970  8.760  1.184  1.001  1.185  1.090  1.292  6.781  7.390 
1971  2.012  1.182  1.000  1.182  1.088  1.286  1.565  1.702 
1972  0.428  1.179  1.000  1.179  1.089  1.284  0.333  0.363 
1973 -0.131  1.178  0.999  1.176  1.088  1.280 -0.102 -0.111 
1974 -1.115  1.173  0.999  1.171  1.077  1.261 -0.884 -0.952 
1975  7.818  1.167  1.000  1.167  1.071  1.249  6.257  6.701 
1976  2.719  1.166  0.999  1.166  1.075  1.253  2.171  2.333 
1977  1.186  1.163  1.000  1.163  1.073  1.248  0.950  1.019 
1978  1.831  1.161  0.999  1.160  1.075  1.248  1.468  1.578 
1979 -1.099  1.161  1.000  1.161  1.075  1.248 -0.881 -0.947 
1980  10.720  1.158  1.001  1.159  1.070  1.241  8.639  9.248 
1981 -5.791  1.155  1.001  1.156  1.065  1.231 -4.705 -5.011 
1982  1.942  1.150  1.001  1.152  1.060  1.221  1.591  1.686 
1983  6.289  1.148  1.001  1.149  1.060  1.218  5.165  5.472 
1984  0.314  1.147  1.001  1.148  1.060  1.217  0.258  0.274 
1985  2.487  1.146  1.001  1.147  1.061  1.217  2.043  2.168 
1986  5.215  1.145  1.001  1.146  1.064  1.219  4.276  4.550 
1987  0.220  1.143  1.001  1.145  1.065  1.219  0.181  0.192 
1988  1.666  1.143  1.001  1.144  1.066  1.220  1.366  1.457 
1989  3.181  1.144  1.000  1.144  1.067  1.221  2.605  2.781 
1990  9.961  1.145  1.000  1.145  1.070  1.225  8.131  8.702 
1991  8.091  1.145  1.000  1.145  1.072  1.228  6.590  7.066 
1992 -0.493  1.143  1.000  1.143  1.070  1.223 -0.403 -0.431 
1993 -3.505  1.138  1.000  1.138  1.065  1.211 -2.894 -3.081 
1994  2.961  1.136  1.000  1.136  1.066  1.210  2.447  2.608 
1995  2.619  1.135  0.999  1.134  1.066  1.209  2.165  2.309 
1996  1.716  1.133  1.000  1.132  1.066  1.207  1.422  1.516 
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Table 7 
     German Cost Dual TFP Growth: Traditional and Corrected 
 
 
Ct??  
R
Ct??  Bias 
F
Ct??  
Bias A
Ct??  
Bias T
Ct??  
Bias 
1954  0.385  4.108  3.723  0.395  0.010  5.327  4.941  5.446  5.061 
1955  1.035  5.238  4.203  1.048  0.014  6.564  5.530  6.680  5.646 
1956  0.182  2.338  2.156  0.176 -0.006  2.749  2.567  2.773  2.591 
1957 -1.119 -0.013  1.106 -1.126 -0.007  0.396  1.515  0.406  1.525 
1958  3.019  4.321  1.302  3.012 -0.007  3.185  0.166  3.215  0.196 
1959  0.880  2.944  2.064  0.889  0.009  3.942  3.062  3.991  3.111 
1960  1.319  3.900  2.581  1.326  0.007  5.071  3.752  5.123  3.805 
1961  1.908  2.746  0.838  1.886 -0.022  4.262  2.354  4.281  2.373 
1962  3.950  5.436  1.486  3.948 -0.002  6.258  2.308  6.277  2.326 
1963  0.892  1.490  0.598  0.885 -0.006  2.026  1.134  2.035  1.143 
1964  2.205  3.876  1.671  2.211  0.006  4.721  2.516  4.750  2.545 
1965  5.677  7.538  1.861  5.681  0.004  8.408  2.731  8.430  2.753 
1966 -4.742 -4.924 -0.182 -4.761 -0.019 -3.924  0.818 -3.927  0.815 
1967 -2.281 -2.349 -0.067 -2.289 -0.008 -1.974  0.307 -1.975  0.306 
1968  9.997  12.755  2.758  10.009  0.012  12.893  2.896  12.911  2.914 
1969  5.286  7.524  2.238  5.283 -0.002  6.868  1.583  6.862  1.577 
1970  9.681  11.109  1.428  9.680  0.000  12.138  2.458  12.146  2.466 
1971  2.554  2.910  0.356  2.552 -0.002  3.231  0.678  3.232  0.678 
1972  1.180  1.827  0.647  1.180  0.000  1.295  0.115  1.294  0.114 
1973  0.132  1.175  1.043  0.128 -0.004  1.108  0.976  1.100  0.968 
1974  0.341  0.235 -0.106  0.343  0.002 -1.366 -1.707 -1.365 -1.706 
1975  6.831  6.183 -0.648  6.833  0.002  5.953 -0.878  5.955 -0.876 
1976  3.046  4.357  1.311  3.040 -0.005  4.129  1.083  4.122  1.076 
1977  1.434  1.600  0.166  1.434  0.000  1.225 -0.209  1.225 -0.209 
1978  1.983  2.502  0.519  1.982 -0.001  2.197  0.214  2.195  0.211 
1979  0.036  0.849  0.813  0.036  0.000  0.421  0.385  0.421  0.384 
1980  9.342  9.436  0.094  9.341 -0.001  9.667  0.325  9.667  0.325 
1981 -5.127 -5.403 -0.276 -5.129 -0.003 -5.408 -0.281 -5.410 -0.283 
1982  0.851  0.355 -0.496  0.846 -0.005  0.167 -0.684  0.162 -0.689 
1983  5.795  5.997  0.202  5.797  0.002  5.611 -0.183  5.613 -0.181 
1984  0.996  1.533  0.537  0.999  0.003  1.404  0.408  1.408  0.412 
1985  2.410  2.972  0.562  2.412  0.002  3.489  1.079  3.493  1.083 
1986  4.303  4.588  0.285  4.303 -0.001  5.357  1.054  5.359  1.056 
1987 -0.217 -0.103  0.114 -0.219 -0.002  0.924  1.141  0.926  1.142 
1988  1.570  2.124  0.554  1.571  0.001  2.716  1.146  2.719  1.149 
1989  2.933  3.584  0.651  2.934  0.000  4.005  1.072  4.007  1.074 
1990  9.855  10.630  0.774  9.855  0.000  10.275  0.420  10.276  0.421 
1991  8.971  9.675  0.704  8.970  0.000  8.436 -0.534  8.435 -0.536 
1992 -0.268 -0.450 -0.182 -0.267  0.001 -0.884 -0.615 -0.883 -0.615 
1993 -3.506 -4.539 -1.033 -3.506  0.000 -5.005 -1.499 -5.005 -1.498 
1994  2.938  3.243  0.304  2.937 -0.001  3.642  0.703  3.641  0.703 
1995  2.686  3.034  0.348  2.685 -0.002  2.974  0.287  2.972  0.286 
1996  1.823  1.818 -0.004  1.822  0.000  1.857  0.034  1.857  0.034 
 
Means 
 
 
Ct??  
R
Ct??  Bias 
F
Ct??  
Bias A
Ct??  
Bias T
Ct??  
Bias 
54-96 2.353 3.213 0.861 2.352 -0.001 3.403 1.050 3.415 1.063 
54-73 2.107 3.697 1.591 2.106 -0.001 4.227 2.120 4.252 2.146 
74-96 2.566 2.792 0.226 2.566 0.000 2.686 0.120 2.686 0.120 
 26
Figure 1.  Adjusting for measurement biases. 
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